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ABSTRACT

This study explored the policy implications of a specificjointly funded government-industry-acadtmc research
The researcher sought to uncover what trends or patterns of the N a t i d
and development initiative on future plan-.
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments (AGATE) had a
these trends, the research may be able to help foster
positive affect on the outcomes of the consortium. By idena more practical transition to follow-n programs. AGATE focused on developing innovative cockpit technologies that
highlighted safety, affordabihty, and ease-of-use based in such areas as flight systems and mkgratd design and
manufacturing. A quahtative analytic methodological approach encompassing qualitative data analysis sofbme and
the policy research construct was applied to analyze the organizatid policy trends through the application of lessons
learned from the AGATE program with reference to the current NASA program-the Small Aircraft Transportation
System (SATS). Both NASA programs consist of a similar participant pool. By examining the effects of
r e c o m m ~ o n from
s previous studies, this analysis illustrated the transitional effects identified through the analysis.
This planning framework illustratedthe evolution of program and goal structure and the catalytic effect on the aviation
industry and product development through increased interaction.
This study's research question focused on
identifying possible underlying trends that may influence
future programs by iden-g
and exploring the patterns
of a joint research alliance through data analysis.
Additionally, secondary research questions looked for
common trends in areas that led to the program's success
as well as points of dissension. This study examined the
salient pa&rns that emerged within the National
..
Aeronautics and Space Admmsrra
tion (NASA) Advanced
General Aviation Transj~~rtExperiments (AGATE)
program. By identifying patterns that indicated how this
organizationfunctioned and performed, the study revealed
valuable information that may contribute to similar
initiatives, such as the Small Aircraft Transportation
System (SATS).
A qualitative framework was employed for the
design of this study given that, "Qualitative research is an
inquiry process of understanding based on distinct
methodologrcal trad~honsor lnqutry that explore a soclru or
human problemn (CreswelI, 1998, p. 15). From this
qualitative framework, the researcher analyzed a dataset
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consisting of interviews with key members of AGATE, a
recent indq-univemity-governmentalliance(Scarpellini
Metz, 2002). The data analysis focused on field notes and
tranmipts from the interviewsto code and identifypatterns
within the dataset as well as exploring the areasmentioned
with the highest frequency. Moreover, the policy research
construct was applied to specific areas of the =search to
further examine the findingsof the dataset produced by the
inte~ewingtool. This strengthened the reliability and
validity of the instrument. Additional analysis was
conducted using NVivo qualitative software (NVivo, 200 1)
to further validate the findings.
The opportunity to take lessons learned from one
NASA program and apply them to another follow+n
program should help in the effectivenessand productivity
of successive programs. Data analysis, through the policy
research construct and the qualitative analysis software,
investigatesthe environment and basis of problems policy
attempts to solve as weu as me poucy responsescompetence in lieu of these problems (Scharpf, 2000). The
successes and failures of NASA-funded progmms have a
Page 43
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direct impact on the current and future programs under
consideration.By seeing how suchprograms operate,policy
decisions are made and future plans influenced. AGATE
and SATSwere developedto work in conjunctionwith each
other with mutually shared information and resources
(GAPO, 2001).
INDUSTRY ENVIRONMENT
The mid-1990s were marked by renewed national
attention to general aviation (GA). GA includes civil
aircraft operating outside of commercial airlines and the
military. In decline s i p the late 1970s, GA sales and
production had decreased sigmficantly in the US (GAMA,
2001). In 1993, aircraft production totaled 954 aircraft
versus 18,000aircraft in 1978(GAO, 2001). The downturn
was felt throughout the industry including in the number of
new pilots and advanced ratings. By 1994 only 96,000
student pilot licenses were issued compared to 150,000 in
1980(GAO, 2001). As opposedto a mere subsidy that may
have only short-term affects, the GA community was
searching for a more long-term solution.
In 1994, the General Aviation Revitalization Act
(GARA) was passed as an effort to remove some of the
limitationsplaced on the industryby expensive lawsuits. In
terms of product liability lawsuits, GARA established an
18-year time limit against the manufacturers of aircraft
with 20 or fewer seats (GAO, 2001). This time limit
applied to aircraft related components, engines, and
airframes. No time constraintshad existedprior to GARA's
passage. in addition to GA operatives and industry
members, the National Commission to Ensure a Strong
Competitive Airline Industry (NCESCAI) was a principal
GARA supporter. The NCESCAI endorsement, linked with
NASA Administrator Dan Goldin as a vocal GA champion,
were critical in achieving a successful passage of the law
(Bolen, 2001). That same year, NASA formed AGATE to
handle the mounting concerns of the GA industry. With
NASA in the leadership role, the federal government
modified its position as a subcontractor and became more
of a venture capitalist participating in AGATE with
industry and academia. Just as the space program
introduced the U.S. to space travel, AGATE was created to
open air travel via personal aircraft up to the general
public.
The eight years since the passage of GARA and
thp ndvanr~rnentnf A G A T F have cmm signifir~ntchanpes

in the GA industry. The AGATE Program triggered
technological transformations that have reverberated
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throughout aviation (GAPO, 2001). The period has been
marked by substantial development and enhanced safety
mechanisms that have benefitted aviation (GAO, 2001). In
addition to safety, the AGATE technologies have been able
to increase the affordability of aviation, as well as
augmenting airspace capacity (GAPO, 2001).
According to GAMA (2001), there has been a
signdicant turnaround in the aviation industry since the
inception of AGATE and GARA. AGATE has provided
crucial contributions to the revitalization of the industry
(GAPO, 2001). Since 1996, aircraft deliveries increased
300 percent and industry billings rose 350percent(GAMA,
2001). Since 1994, sedorjobs have risenby 10percent and
the U.S. export market has reclaimed nearly 20 percent of
its lost business (GAMA, 2001). Industry growth has been
accentuated by an applauded downturn in accidents.
Aviation accidents declined by 41 percent between 1992
and 1999. (GAO, 2001). There is no indication of a
reversal of this trend. AGATE technologies played an
important role in this industry rebound (Bolen, 2001).
AGATE OrganizationalFramework
Through NASA's General Aviation Program
Office (GAPO), based at NASA's Langley Research Center
in Langley, Virginia, AGATE focused its efforts on
bolstering the industry and creating new transportation
opportunities. This joint effort between industry, NASA,
and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) allowed
the AGATE program eight years (1994-2001) to revive the
GA industry (GAO, 2001). NASA allocated$52 million to
operationalize this rebirth (AGATE Alliance, 2001).
Centered on industry revitalization, NASA created separate
work padrages to group consortium members based on
three principal areas. These areas were fundamentally
safety, affordability, and ease-of-use.
AGATE'S primary goals were to develop the
technological components that would render a safe, low
cost,efficient,private use aircraft. As a follow-on program,
SATS was tasked with developing the infrastructure for a
transportation system that could alleviate the congestion at
major hub-and-spoke airports as well as within the
interstate highway system (Bowen, Holmes, & Hansen,
2000). GAPO provided the primary leadership role and
maintained budgetary control.
Within AGATE, the approximately 72 participani
ormizations were oreanized into work -~!es
with a
total of eight work packages completing the program. Each
work package functioned with mutually shared program
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and work package goals as well as the competing interests
of the part~cipants.Additional funding came from several
of the participants in equitable proportions. In the sevenyear life span of the program, the total investment exceeded
$300 million dollars. Sixty-two percent of that was from
federal sources; the remainder, or 38 percent, came from
the private and nonprofit sectors (GAPO, 2001).
By the time AGATE was Illystructuxd and in
operation, the work packages focused on innovativecockpit
technologies that were broken down into eight sections.
The work package number v d working titles of these
sectionswere as follows: (1) Flight Systems, (3) Integrated
Design and Manufacturing, (5) Integration Platforms, (6)
Flight Training Curriculum, (7) System Assurance, (8)
Management of Public-Private Alliances, (11) Systems
Engineering, and (12) AGATE Program (AGATE
Alliance, 2001). The other work packages, such as, (2)
Propulsion Sensors and Controls (4) Ice Protection, were
canceled due to changing priorities and funding duringthe
course of the program.
Companies participated at three categories of
membership: principal, associate,andsupporting. The level
of participation depended on the financial and workforce
resources that a company was willing and able to
contribute. fincipal members often offered important
technical contributions in one or more work packages.
Principal and government members led tasks.Associate or
supporting members handled only agreed upon sub-tasks.
Each member played an important part in the creation of a
suteam. Competitive groups operated within and
between the work packages.
The organizational strucftue of AGATE blended
management and leadership within the public and private
sector. Typically NASA managers acted as work package
leaders and reported back to GAPO. Overall, these leaden
came from government organizations deemed by NASA to
be most suitable to a Specrfic area of focus. Also, every
work package had a technical council made up of a
representative from each of the voting members'
o r g M o n s . Work package leaders also functioned as the
chaqerson of these councils. The technical council
established the work package's research and technology
(R&T) priorities, prepared annual R&T plans, and
distributed funds to work package members.

federal acquisition regulations (Office of Aeronautics,
1998). The agreement encouraged an open flow of
information and collaboration across groups. Regular
reports and feedback were considered critical to assisting
the information flow and technological development. "This
unique agreement allowed for greater flexibility while
allowing participants to take risks with higher payoffs,
accelerate technology transfer, manage control of
proprietary and joint technologies, and increase eflicient
use of limited resourcesM(Scarpelhi Metz, 2002, p. 9).
The JSRA mandated the distribution of AGATE-related
information. Additionally, all members agreed to the terms
of the JSRA in writing. This included providing quarterly
updates on project status and an account of the spending of
AGATE funds. However, while the JSRA may have
dictated the terms of the program, the agreement was
diflicult to maintain and enforce with the regular turnover
in NASA management and leadership positions.
While NASA has often been the subject of
previous research, the AGATE program and subsequent
SATS program are unique in their combination of the
federal government, private industry, and academia on
essentially equal ground (GAPO, 2001). Frequently,
NASA handles the development and management of
projects by awarding private companies contracts to
develop specific elements of a program. This was the case
in the Space Shuttle Program and the tragic consequences
of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986. In this instance,
while a technological flaw contributed to the disaster, the
larger cause came from a management breakdown
(Stillman, 2000). "NASAand ultimatelyits contractors had
left the traditionally conservativedesign, development, and
testing stage behind. The result was they began to
rationalize away, they failed to communicate..." @. 121).
The organizational structure of this program, though
effective in achieving technological advances, was flawed
in its management. This flaw hampered the overall
effectiveness of the program and was detrimental to the
success of the program. The management and
organizational structure of AGATE could also limit the
effectivenessofthe program if similar shortcomingsare not
addressed.
POLICY ENVIRONMENT
The policy environment surrounding AGATE had

t (TSR A)

a simificant impact nn gm~rpinteraction and propress.

governed the AGATE program. The JSRA was constructed
to avoid many of the barriers commonly associated with

Changes in policy environment created new issues,
depending on the compatibility between the changes and
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current national policy legacies(Scharpf, 2000). According

to Scharpf, personal and organizational self-interest
operates in conjunction and in conflict with normative
obligations and ambitions. This contributed to a
differentiation amid system maintenance and goal
achievement. Individual institutional norms and
motivation, as well as that of the AGATE organization
itself, shaped the cognitive orientation of the participants
(2000). For example, AGATE participants struggled with
their unique institutional norms especially during the
development stage of the program structure.Throughout
the first two years of the program, there was considerable
movement as original members left AGATE because their
organizations were unable to adjust to the norms selected
and implementedby AGATE. Other organizations with a
better fit took their place to finish out the program life
cycle.
The environmental instability slowed progress as
work packages changed management and funding in
responseto policy alterations.Learninghow to work within
and among the work packages was a critical step toward
achieving AGATE'S program goals. The combination of a
flexible policy and growing trust make this possible
(Scharpf, 2 o w .
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The ability to take lessons learned from one NASA
program and apply them to another followsn program
should help in the effectiveness and productivity of
successive programs. Policy research investigates the
environment and basis of problems that policy attempts to
solve as well as the policy responses' expertise in response
to these problems (Scharpf, 2000). The successes and
failuresof NASA-funded programs have a direct impact on
the current and future programs under consideration. By
seeing how such programs operate, policy decisions should
be made and future plans intluenced.
Policy cotlsi&Policy change tended to be incremental in nature.
By gradually introducing successful programs with
innovative ideas, business had the opportunity had to
capitalize on the oooperative efforts (Robbins, 2000).
Formerly high-risk ventures now seemed within reach. In
order to respond to these considerations, the researcher
explored the possible implications by adyzing an
AGATE-based dataset. The com~ositionofcross-functional
teams working to achieve the goals of AGATE helped to
illushatethe necessary processes. These include the need to

develop, manage, and build trust between people of such
varied backgrounds (Robbins, 2000). The processes and
trends revealed may be applied to current and future
initiatives of this type.
The policy environment surroundingAGATE had
a sigmficant impact on group interaction and progress.
Changes in policy environment created new issues, which
depended on the compatibility between the changes and
current national policy legacies (Scharpf, 22000). Reduced
funding and support reflected a change in federal
leadership. According to Scharpf, personal and
organizational self-interest, in such situations, operates in
conjunctionwith and in conflict with nonnative obligations
and ambitions. This flexibility promoted a differentiation
amid systemmaintenanceand goal achievement. Individual
institutional norms and motivation, as well as that of the
AGATE organization itself, shaped the cognitive
orientation of the participants (Scharpf). For example,
AGATE participants struggled with their unique
institutional norms especially during the initial
development stage of the work packages. Throughout the
first two years of the program, there was considerable
movement as original members left AGATE becausetheir
organizations were unable to adjust to the norms selected
and implemented by AGATE. Other organizations,
hopefully with a better fit, took their place to finish out the
program life cycle. The lack of continuity was a detriment
to the program, but it also brought in fresh ideas that may
have been better able to reach the intended goals of the
Program.
Scharpf (2000) says, "policy challenges are
themselvb a complex concept that is best defined by the
interaction between three sets of f h c t o ~ h a n g e in
s the
policy environment impacting on more or less vulnerable
socioeconomic structures and on more or less vulnerable
policy legacies7' @. 768). According to Scharpf, the
research questions for this study should have high
predictive power that permit the researcher to identify
expectations in terms of trends and processes even though
there may be a limited amount of information available. In
terms of AGATE, the researcher hoped to discover
processesand trendsthat may aid program developers. This
insight might assist the developers in their predictivepowz
to prevent creating the same structuraland orgauizational
misiudmenk that limited AGATE in follow-on p r o m .
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currentnational policy legacies (Scharpf, 2000). According
to Scharpf, personal and organizational self-interest
operates in conjunction and in conflict with normative
obligations and ambitions. This contributed to a
differentiation amid system maintenance and goal
achievement. Individual institutional norms and
motivation, as well as that of the AGATE organization
itself, shaped the cognitive orientation of the participants
(2000). For example, AGATE @cipants struggled with
their unique institutional norms especially during the
development stage of t h program
~
structure. Throughout
the first two years of the program, there was considerable
movement as original members left AGATE because their
organizations were unable to adjust to the norms selected
and implemented by AGATE. Other organizations with a
better fit took their place to finish out the program life
cycle.
The environmental instability slowed progress as
work packages changed management and funding in
responseto policy alterations.Learninghow to work within
and among the work packages was a critical step toward
achieving AGATE'S program goals. The combination of a
flexible policy and growing trust make this possible
(Scharpf, 2000).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The ability to take lessons learned from one NASA
program and apply them to another follow-on program
should help in the effectiveness and productivity of
successive programs. Policy research investigates the
environment and basis of prob1ems that policy attempts to
solve as well as the policy responses' expertise in response
to these problems (Scharpf, 2000). The successes and
failures of NASA-funded programs have a direct impact on
the current and future programs under consideration. By
seeing haw such programs operate, policy decisions should
be made and future plans intluenced.
P o k y Con*&s
Policy change tended to be incremental in nature.
By gradually introducing successful programs with
innovative ideas, business had the opportunity had to
capitalize on the oooperative efforts (Robbins, 2000).
Formerly high-risk ventures now seemed within reach. In
order to respond to these considerations, the researcher
explored the possible implications by analyzhg an
AGATE-based dataset. The comwsitiondcroex-functional
teams working to achieve the goals of AGATE helped to
illustratethe necessary processes. These include the need to
-- -

-

Page 46

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2004

-

develop, manage, and build trust between people of such
varied backgrounds (Robbins, 2000). The processes and
trends revealed may be applied to current and future
initiatives of this type.
Thepolicy environment surroundingAGATE had
a significant impact on group interaction and progress.
Changes in policy environment created new issues, which
depended on the compatibility between the changes and
current national policy legacies (Scharpf, 2000). Reduced
funding and support reflected a change in federal
leadership. According to Scharpf, personal and
organbtional self-interest, in such situations, operates in
conjunction with and in conflict with normative obligations
and ambitions. This flexibility promoted a differentiation
amid systemmaintenanceand goal achievement.Individual
institutional norms and motivation, as well as that of the
AGATE organization itself, shaped the cognitive
orientation of the participants (Scharpf). For example,
AGATE participants struggled with their unique
institutional norms especially during the initial
development stage of the work packages. Throughout the
first two years of the program, there was considerable
movement as on@ members I& AGATE because their
organizations were unable to adjust to the norms selected
and implemented by AGATE. Other organizations,
hopefully with a better fit, took their place to finish out the
program life cycle. The lack of continuity was a detriment
to the program, but it also brought in fresh ideas that may
have been better able to reach the intended goals of the
P=ogram.
Scharpf (2000) says, "policy challenges are
themselves-a complex concept that is best defined by the
interaction between three sets of factors-changes in the
policy environment impacting on more or less vulnerable
socioeconomic structures and on more or less vulnerable
policy legacies" @. 768). According to Scharpf, the
research questions for this study should have high
predictive power that permit the researcher to identify
expectations in terms of trends and processes even though
there may be a limited amount of information available. In
terms of AGATE, the researcher hoped to discover
p m s e s and trendsthat may aid program developers. This
insight might assist the developers in their predictive power
to prevent creating the same structuraland organizational
misiudgments that limited AGATE in follow-on ~ r o m a m .
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Organizational Structure and Theory
The organizational structure used by the AGATE
program limits the power of the formal role. This role was
not able not dictate participants' behavior. While some of
the strengths of the Classical approach of organizational
theory, such as straightforward tasks and a stable
environment may have been helpful, they also would have
restricted the program's natural flow. AGATE required a
structure that was adaptable to the changing environment
associated with such a technology-based program (Jreisat,
1997). As Chester Barnard +d, "Cooperation.. .justifies
itself as a means of overcoming the limitations of what
individuals can do.. .exists when two conditions are met:
accomplishmentof the cooperativepurposeand satisfaction
of individual motives" (Jreisat, 1997, p. %).
The cooperation between and within the work
package teams was a critical part of the organization's
stmclme. In this sense, Open Systems theory may be
ahropriate to analyzing the trends associated with
AGATE. According to Jreisat (1997), the key criteria for
organizational effectiveness include flexibility and
responsiveness, continual adaptation and innovation to get
resources, holistic view of unit, high risk, and common
vision and values. With programs such as AGATE, a team
approach is more appropriate because the project has a
beginning and an end as based on the NASA program plan.
As a result, they are more fluid than other organizational
structures (Harrison, 2002). Therefore, a more stringent
framework, such as those associated with the Rational
Model or Classical Approach to organizationaltheory, may
have stifled the innovative nature of the program. However,
multiple partner organizations with flexible structure are
subject to error-prone behavior such as that associated with
the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster (McNeese, 19%).
These types of partnerships often foster reduced
information sharing and miscommunications which may
lead to coordination difficulties as well as
organizationavhuman factors failures (McNeese, 1996).
Increasingly, organizations are using teams or
work groups to accomplish specific tasks. Within the
context of Open Systems theory, sociotechnical systems
theory focuses on key issues that affect these teams or work
packages in the case of AGATE. While team use is on the
rise, the dissatisfaction from this work experience is also
fairlv high (Hacker & Kleiner. 1996).Bv examining these
sociotechnical issues, the quality of the work experience
and performauce may be imprwed. According to Hacker
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and Kleiner, little is known about the working of these
groups outside of laboratory conditions. This limits the
research's usefulness since, "it is only in the field where
contextual variables can be adequately represented" @.
471).
Sociotechnical research has shown that by
strengtheningthe underlying social and technical elements
of an organization the performance results will be
optimized. To emphasize the social over the technical, as
some recent interventions have done, would be
counterproductive (Hacker & Kleiner, 1996). The social
system containsthe work grouplpackageparticipants, their
relationship with each other, and their relationship with the
larger organization including members of other work
groupdpackages. The technical s y k are made up of the
rules and policies, such as the JSRA, which the participants
use to convert inputs into outputs (Pasmore, 1988). This
element ties in closely to performance exjxctations. Both
elements have considerable impact on the overall
performance of a work group.
AGATE has additional issues to consider since
many of its work packages involved cross-functional teams.
Hacker and Kleiner (1996) say evidence suggests a critical
factor in these types of teams is formalizing the group
processes. By establishing a formal method, decision
making is improved which increases performance. In these
instances,individual participants have little interest in the
project outside their own realm. Since they are not
accountablefor knowledge involving other areas, they often
do not feel responsible for sharing information (Gallaway,
19%). With no one accountable to the entin?program, the
quality information is compromised and the performance
d e n . The organizational structuremust not be allowedto
be a barrier to the cross-functional flow of information.
While participants may need to be jointly grouped for
administrative purposes, they should not be isolated by the
group designation (Hamson, 2002). By designing the
structure to facilitate program strategy, participants can
then adjust themselves to meet the organization's needsand
their own.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The objective was to gain a clearer understandhg
behind the trends that led to the successes of this jointly
funded research and development initiative. To obtain this
obiective, the study focused on three research questions.
The resultant findings and follow-on behavior contributed
to the study of policy research discussed in the previous
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section of this paper. "In many qualitative studies, the real
interest is how participants make sense of what has
happened, and how this perspective informs their actions,
rather than determining precisely what took place"
(Maxwell 1998, p. 84). With this in mind,the researcher
analyzed the dataset.
1.
What trends may have contributed to
AGATE'Ssuccesses as a research alliance?
2.
Which of these successful trends may
contribute to other research alliances, such as SATS?
3.
Are $ere any common trends that
illustrate where dissension may have hindered AGATE'S
success?

Due to the complex and multifaceted nature of this
program, it was necesmy to develop specific boundaries
for this study. The areas the researcher chose to focus on
were based on the high level of industry interest in what
helped to make AGATE a success. These occurred aside
from any technological advances. The transfer of this
organizational structure has the potential to be helpful to
other programs with similar interests,but less technological
concentration. Theseboundaries were selectedbasedon the
time and means limits of this study to properly frame the
research parameters (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
METHODLOGY
A qualitative data analysis of the AGATE
program, employing an interview instrument method of
inquiry, was used to identify information on trends and
patterns that applied to future NASA programs such as
SATS. The primary data source for this research was an
AGATE-based dataset collected in summer 2001
(ScarpelliniMetz, 2002). Datacollection,organization, and
analysis played a significant role in the process. The
collection and organization depended entirely on the
methods used and what the actual data consisted of, be it
field notes or transcripts. The data provided interview
feedback compiled about the AGATE program, based at
GAPO's NASA Langley Research Center in Langley,
Virginia, from its participants.
POLICY RESEARCH CONSTRUCT
APPLICATION
In conducting policy research, such as that associated with
AGATE and SATS, the levels of inquiry needed to remain
n p n Pnlicy reseatch is a "m1ilti4imensinnal.emniricoinductive, malleability-oriented, reciprocating and
communicating process" (Majchrzak in Bowen and Lu,

2002, p. 2). As such, the data-collection tool required added
flexibility and was not rigidly designed. Multifaceted
themes were revealed through a blended approach such as
interview and field research. Bowen and Lu (2002)
presented a policy research construct that attended to the
interests of the public and public need through the policymaking mechanism of aviation. They examined the
instrumental reasoning used as the basis of policy making
and challengedthe use of applied statisticsto addresssocial
problems such as those associated with an over-burdened
interstate highway system and a restrictive hubandspoke
airway system (Bowen, Holmes & Hansen, 2000). The
application of the policy research construct provided a
manner to operationalize the patterns found in the data
analysis stage of this research. By viewing the patterns in
this context, the researcher could offer recommendations
about possible policy modification that may better enable
SATS to achieve its goals. Additionally, comparison of the
results allowed the researcher to strengthen the validity and
possible reliability of the Study.
S w W
The focused nonprobability sampling was
employed in this study to expose a confined relationship at
greater depth (Berg, 2001; Miles & Huberman, 1994). By
using this focused framework, in conjunction with
purposive or judgmental sampling, it was easier to make
educated guesses and detect trends within the larger group.
The sampling lent itself to determining attributes of
background and processes. The focused samplingpertained
to the system of choosing conditions that provided
descriptive illustrations or that offered suitable
investigation of a theory (de Vaus, 2001).
In this case it was appropriate for the sample of
interview subjects to be selected based on the researcher's
knowledge of the population, the recommendationsof field
experts, and the nature of the intended research (Babbie,
1999; Berg, 2001). Only a small subset of the AGATE
population was chosen to take part in the interview process.
However, this was a representativegroup that demonstrated
the basic elements of the entire program population. The
participant pool included a combination of large and small
companies, as well as federal and higher education
members. The pool also included members directly
involved with AGATE, as well as those who worked with
the roer ram h m outside the inner circle. The intent was
to interview someonefrom each of the eight work packages.
Additional interviews were conducted to gain better depth
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and to include participants from the three areas of
involvement-government, industry, and academia. A
representative group that showed the basic elements of the
population was interviewed. These participants fell within
each of the eight work packages AGATE and were divided
into a combination of the three organizational types.
A limited amount of snowball sampling was also
employed to ensure that key individuals were not
unintentionally excluded from the process. Snowballing,
also referred to as accidental sampling, was useful when it
was d8icult to locate members of the population (Babbie,
1999). In this case, members i f the target population were
asked for information to help in locating other members.
Since this was a fairly close-knit group, snowball sampling
was only necessary on a limited basis.
Demographically, the participant group clearly
represented the larger population of AGATE. The vast
majority of this population was white males ranging from
25 to 70 years in age. There were no females holding key
positions and very few minorities. As a result, the sampling
consisted of 30 white males and 3 nonwhite males. Of five
possible interview subjects who were not able to complete
the study, prior to the September 11,2001cutoff or due to

other time limitations, they all fit the primary demographic.
Interview Process for Dataset Construction
The transcripts were based on interviews that
consisted of five multi-part open-ended questions (See
Table 1). These questions were selected from a larger pool
of questions to focus on specific areas of AGATE that
might be helpful to a future multi-institutional partnership
such as the newly launched SATS that is currently under
GAPO's guidance. Key GAP0 administrators were
involved in the selection process to support the internal
validity of the findings. The interview questions were
developed from a comprehensive review of materials and
literature about the program (Fink, 1995). They were
consolidated, constructed, and validated through expert
analysis that included NASA administrators and academic
authorities. This review enhanced the validity of the
questions and strengthened their reliability in the context
of the study (GAO, 1991). Due to the exploratory nature of
the research questions, these interview questions were
appropriate for gathering the perceptions of the AGATE
paltlcipants.

Table 1. Interview Questions for Existing Dataset

I
2
3
4
5

How long have you been involved in AGATE and how has your role evolved over that time?
From your perspective, what were AGATE'Sproblems and successes?
How would you characterize the federal leadership and management ofAG4 TE?
What kind of advice do you have for future partnerships?
Zfyou had to do it over again, would you still become involved in AGATE?
,

Source: Scarpellini Metz, 2002
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The information from this dataset took into consideration
the limitations of the less than optimum interview setting.
Five broad, openended questions were used to allow the
interview subjects to respond fully to the issues under
consideration. They offered the interviewees the
opportunity to answer with as much or as little information
as they personally desired. None of the parl~cipantswere
aware of this research project or possibility of being
interviewed until they were contacted to set a time for the
interview. Interviews were scheduled on the spot with little
lead-time for anyone ,involved. In order to gain the
spontaneous responses, interview questions were not
released prior to the interview. The majority of industry
members were interviewed at the Experimental Aircraft
Association Airventure in Oshkosh, Wisconsin to
minimize travel time. The interviewer then traveled to
NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia to
complete the remainder of the interviews with the NASA
participants.
Using a combination of face-to-face and phone
interviews, the interviews were recorded on microcassettes
that were later transcribed. Due to technological
limitations, only one of the four phone interviews could be
recorded. The transcripts from these remaining three
interviews were prepared from the researcher's notes.
The 33 interviews provided a representative
sample of the AGATE 72 participant organizations. As a
result, 46% of participant organizations took part in the
study. More interviews were scheduled, but the events of
September 11,2001 ended the interview phase of the study
to maintain a sense of continuity within the dataset and to
bound the study.The sampling wasbasedon a cross-section
of all three-partner groups: government, industry, and
academia. The primary researcher, a doctoral research
assistant, conducted the interviews.
During the course of this study, all participants
were contacted. At this time, they were allowed to review
their interview transcripts and make any changes they
believed were necessary in clarifying their position. Ofthe
33 participants, 8 responded with minor clarifications and
2 offered more significant exposition of their interviews.
Validity and Reliability

The validity ofthisdataset was verified by internal
and external factors (ScarpelliniMetz, 2002). The majority

addressed the research questions of this study. While the
interviews were open, the transcripts were deemed
confidential to enhance the response rate of the
participants. Some feared the loss of funding if less than
favorable comments were reported to NASA. By ensuring
confidentiality, the study was able to obtain more reliable
results.
By examining the dataset that contained a variety
of perspectives, including primary and peripheral
participants, the researcher elucidated trends that may be
useful to the operation of futuremulti-institutional, private,
and publicly funded programs. To facilitate and group the
findings, interview transcripts were examined in the
context of the three research questions. Each area reflected
a compilation of the 33 intervie&. The findingsfocused on
the consensus view as well as any notable outliers to
illustrate the overall trends that revealed themselves
through the interviews.
The inclusion or exclusion of content occurred
with reference to the criteria of selection. These criteria
must be exhaustive to interpret the divergence of message
content and exercised consistently (Berg, 2001). As an
intended result, other researchers looking at the same
communication will achievethe same or equivalent results.
"This may be considered a kind of reliability of measures,
and a validation of eventual findings" @. 241). The initial
data analysis occurred manually. Future analysis included
the NVivo software to enhance some conventional aspects
of data maintenance. NVivo also permitted the researcher
to substantially tramform the data. The increased ease of
replicability strengthened qualitative data analysisin terms
of validity'(Este et al;, 1998). This study confrmed many
of the original findings thus strengthening the overall
validity of the results.
The dataset was developed based on the input of
established experts in the field of interview research and
program development. "A design is internally valid if it is
free from nonrandom error or bias" (FW 1995, p. 56).
The sample was based on the configurationof the AGATE
work packages. Participants were selected based on their
organization's role in AGATE in order to collect a
representative grouping. This research examined the
dataset based on individual afZiliation that was
predetermined and mutually agreed upon before the onset
A G A T E The dataset's mntent validity was h a d on its

of participantc tmlr a gentline interect in the ctirr~~Ffi11

nf

completion of the study and offered suggestions on possible
key interview subjects. Research based on this dataset

ability to include the meanin@ scope attended to within
the concept (Babbie, 1999). Questions were limited to
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enable the interviewee to respond as fully as desired.
Specific information was not sought, but rather behavioral
trends.
Participants were well-versed on their
organization's involvement in AGATE. As the direct point
of contact, they were in the position to offer the most useful
and valid data. Conducting a crossamparison between
research notes and the findings from the NVivo qualitative
software further validated the study. Coding was reviewed
and revised to maintain the integrity of the study.
Since an existing dataset was used for this study,
the question of reliability wasp fundamental guideline. To
be useful, according to Baker (1999), the data must survey
what they claim to and these standards must be pertinent to
the present study's variables. The dataset was selected in
accordancewith the following considerationsfor secondary
analyses: "(1) the quality of the data-gathering
organization, (2) the purpose of the original researcher, and
(3) the extent to which the dataset contains indicators that
Gll enable you to test your research problem" (Baker,
1999, p. 292). The participants and the dataset were
selected based on their representation of the sample and
resulting generalizeability. Trying to feevaluate the data
produced better knowledge of their sigmiicance. This
reliability was tested by the repeatabiity of the evaluation
to maintain consistent results in previous studies, as well as
current and future analysis (Babbie, 1999). The analysis
conducted via qualitative soflmre was compared to
previous manual analysis which was able enhance and
more clearly define the trends and patterns.
Limitations
The limitations of this study involved several
areas. The researcher assumed the dataset, based on
interviews with AGATE pa~I~cipants,consisted of a
representative cross section that could fully reveal the
program's sig.luficant patterns. Secondly, it was assumed
that the scope of research questions was sufficient in terms
of meeting research objectives. Based on review by content
experts, it was estimated that the questions were a reliable
qualitativeassessment to obtain information in accordance
with research objectives. Also,the research was limited by

-
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the researcher's ability to interpret and code the dataset
using the NVivo software. Additionally, wefd patterns
may not have been identilied. Working within these
limitationsthe researcherattempted to successfullycompile
the data in a constructive and valuable format. Particular
observation was given to the subjects' intent and in
determining the underlying message (Berg, 200 1). The
textual material was classified in order to abstract the
relevant and applicable data without infringing on any
ethical considerations.
These possible limitations were taken into
considerationwhen preparingthe research questionsand in
their analysis. This study's theoretical framework was used
to derive the constructs. Additionally, while it was not
possible to assess all trends, the 'data collected were
believed to be a good representation of the issues
recognized in the literature.
DATA ANACYSIS PLAN
Through data analysis the researcher intended to
organize, reduce and structure the data so as to construe
meaning and trends from the dataset. The interviews were
analyzed to determine the related perceptions that connect
aspects of reality in respect to the objectives of the study
(Holstein & Gubriurn, 1995). This agreement was applied
and analyzed with reference to this study's research
questions. According to Wolcott (1994 in Este, Sippert &
Barksy, 1998), analysis applied to the classification of
fundamental elements and the systematic portrayal of
interrelationships between the observations and narration.
This process is illustrated through Components of Data
Analysis: Interactive Model designed by Huberman and
Miles (1994) (Figure 1). In this design, the "analysis is
sequential and interactive"@. 433). Data analysis involved
data reduction, display, and conclusionshrerification(Berg,
2001, p. 35). To facilitate a richer analysis, the qualitative
data analysis software was employed to "perform repetitive
analysis functions more efficiently, but also to enhance the
et al.,
process of theory building and testing as we1l"ste
1998, p. 2).

-

-
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1
reduction

Conclusions:

-.( drawingknfy )

Figure I. Components of Data Analysis: Interactive Model . Source:Huberman & Miles, 1994, p. 429.

Within the research community, there is concern
about the potential for technology to transcend the path of
inquiry. This translates into the consideration that
researchers may exchange concentrated analyses for largescale analysis associated with quantitative research, and
that the computer technology boundaries will become 'the
study's boundaries (Hesser-Biber, 1995, in Este, et al.,
1998). To avoid this, the reseadm remained aware of the
underlymg methodology that forms the software in order
for the resultant study's process to be free from this
influence.The use of such software was intricately related
to qualitative research's theoretical and methodological
basis (Morison & Moir, 1998). To maintain the integrity of
qualitative research, the researcher attempted to remain
neutral to the analysis process.
Since the study could not contain everything
concerning the AGATE program, it focused on patterns of
ideological perceptions and themes while being thoroughly
grounded in the data. As a retmpective qualitative study,
this research included i n f o d o n that references
AGATE'S program period. According to de Vaus (2001)'

achieve this analysis the dataset was examined in detail
with potential variables focused in areas of possible causal
b r s that may influence future progams as well as
common trends of items that led to the program's success
and dissension.
Unit of Andy&
For the purpose of this exploratory study, tbe unit
of analysis was based at the individual level as determimi
by analyzing the dataset in terms of the parlicipant's
AGATE work package m a t i o n . According to de Vaus
(2001), the unit of analysis was the entity from which the
data was collected and the conclusions formulated. By
cleariy defining the unit of analysis, the researcher was
better able to create the boundaries necessary to limit the
study (Reichardt & Mark,1998).
The individual participantswere thedirect contact
people involved personally in the work packages as opposed
to a media representative from the representative
orgmkitions. They were selected for the dataset building
interview based on accessibility and ability to respond to
their organization's involvement in the AGATE program.

build up a claw snd reacon&ly detailed

T1cin.g the individiinl nc t h unit
~ of nnalmic. the aim of the

picture of the sequence in which events took place and of
the context in which they oocurred" (p. 228). In order to

findings was able to reveal the social dynam~csoperating
within the AGATE population. The perceptions were

"the ~

n ie lto
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analyzed based on AGATE'S influence on the individual
and vice versa. The mcipants were the AGATE point of
contact person within the organization. They were actively
involved in AGATE and tended to be their organization's
primary decision maker in terms of AGATE.
Data Analysis Sofhvare Application
By employing data analysis via the qualitative
software, the researcher intended to obtain an objective
vantage point of the existing dataset. The software helped
to reduce the human factor that has the potential to
introduce unnecaary bias tp the analysis. The use of
predetermined variables and attributes enabled the
researcher to scan the data and detect any trends.
Additional variables were also included when a trend
became apparent. The predetermined definitions may have
limited some of the options for discovery by not taking into
consideration particular working or phraseology that may
not have originally occurred to the researcher.
'
To operationalize the study, the entire dataset was
imported into NVivo Qualitative Research software. Each
tramaipt document or node was given a specific value and
perhaps a range of values depending on the attribute. Each
transcript was coded based on the time in AGATE, work
package affiliation, organization type, and race of
participant. Where applicable three null values of
Unassigned, Unknown, and Not Applicablewere speciiied.
This allowed for a more rigorous analysis. The data were
then organized, linked, categorized, questioned, shaped,
and synthesized by manipulating the NVivo software
(Richards, 1999). The same attributes applied to all
transcript documents, while the values differed where
appropriate. The applied values were used consistently by
the software.
Coding was the primary categorizing strategy in
qualitative research. The goal of coding was to split the
data and reconstruct them into categories that e-ted
correlation between items in the corresponding category
and amid categories(Maxwell, 1998). Coding reflected key
words and phrases. The codes were created with reference
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to the research questions and interview questions. Tree
nodes developed as relationships between responses were
detected. The nodes were under a constant stage of
development throughout the analysis to ensure that critical
information was not ignored for failing to fit into a
predetermined node. Several free nodes were created, as
necessary, to address changing needs of the data. As the
analysis continued, nodes were grouped according to
revealed affiliations. Some nodes that originally seemed
important were later merged with other nodes as no pattern
developed supporting their existence.
The data analysis linked to NVivo software was
well situated to accomplish this task. Each transcript was
thoroughly engaged in the coding process. In the process of
analyzingthe data, codes were refined and additional codes
were added where necessary. As such, "a careful balance
must be struck between efticiency considerations and
design flexibility" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 151).
FINDINGS
The findings for this study centered on the 33
interviews carried out during the 2001 summer. The
research notes from each interview were analyzed to
distinguish trends in terms of the three research questions.
The organization of the findings section d a t e s to these
research questions. The lessons learned were linked to the
current SATS program. Specrfic observations were
condensed and integrated throughout the findings. Any
identifying information was removed to maintain the
confidentiality of the participants' commentsas guaranteed
during the initial interview. According to Marshall &
Rossman (1999), the structuralframeworkof this study was
revealed through data analysis in the context of the
participants' perspectives. The series of phases involved in
the management of data is expressed in Figure 2. Origioal
findings were based primarily on interview questions. As
the nodes and coding system developed the resultsrevealed
the underlying themes expressed in the tramcripts.
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1.

Interviews transcribed and boundaries of
text units defined using word processing

I
I'
Data imported into NVivo

3.

Codtng assigned to text units and references to text units
placed into hierarchical codmglindexing system (tree nodes)

d

I

4.

1

. Codtng system searched and data retrieved
b OUTPUT finds of
the search could be:

according to specified search parameters
1

I

I

Facilitatin
Primary
purpose:

Identifying and testing trends between
concepts and policy relationships
-t

Figure 2. Flow Diagram Illustrating Data Management

As the coding system was searched and data
retrieved, additional codes were created and some codes
were merged based on the output. Through careful coding
and recoding, the qualitative data analysis enhanced the
investigation of &anscripts that revealed general statements
leading to the comection between categories of data. The
initial coding system contained aver 100
nodes.
Through analysis and searching, the nodes were linked and
merged to create a workable design reflecting the trends of
the key research questions. Some of the trends were
expressed as tree nodes with representative branches. This
method of data management facilitated the researcher's
and testing trends between
primary purpose of idenconcepts and possible policy relationships.
What trends may have contributed to AGATE'S
successesas a research alliance?
There are several trends that revealed
themselves as a result of the data analysis concerning this
ailestion. The mihiect of AGATE'S sushowed the
most agreement of all the research questions. Participants
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Source: Adapted from Morison and Moir, 1997.

agreed that AGATE initiated an effective new business
approach. The most notable success was the joining
together of organizations within the industry from
various situations. Ultimately these separate
organizations worked as a collective unit for the common
good. In addition to producing tangible outputs such as
specific technologicalproducts and certification
procedures, AGATE also fostered less tangible
sociotechnical outputs such as cooperation and
relationship building. Of the 33 participants, 18
considered this development of industry-wide focus to be
one of AGATE'S most sigmficant successes. This
occurred by reducing the risks typically associated with
similar collaborations. In the end, through common
collaboration, work packages produced products that
could get to market. The NVivo model illustrating
AGATE'S successes based on nodes attributed to the
inteniew tmmcripts is illustrated in Figure 3.
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I AGATE' s Successes
..

,

Industry Focus

Certification Procedures

Technological Procedures

Figure 3. AGATE Successes Tree Node

There was a general consensus among parttcipants
that this collaboration between various counterpartswould
not have occurred without AGATE. At the very least, it
would have been a long way out. By working together,
overhead costs decreased for everyone. Smaller companies
were not limitedby their financialresources.Thereforethey
were free to explore technology more aggressively. This
careful, protected cooperation, which created overall
integration, was one the greatest successes of AGATE. The
participants' perception was that AGATE allowed more
companies to become actively involved in general aviation.
While there was still division along company lines, the
participants found the level of teamwork to be a critical
example of the success of AGATE with 17 participants
noting its significance.
Many participants considered AGATE to be
instrumental in addressing certification issues that
previously were too timeconsuming and expensive.
According to seven participants, AGATE changed the way
materials are certitied. They saw the program as having a
profound effect on aircraft over the next five to ten years.
Due to AGATE'S efforts, it became possible to certify
materialsfaster, sa€erand cheaper than before. This change
may expedite the development and certification of
composite aircraft. Also, there has been a tremendous
improvement in the area of production where standard
methods have been establishedfor certifyingmaterial. Four
participants noted superb cooperation between FAA and
NASA in mrtificatinn T h ~ y

the indllfihy impact

extending beyond the U.S. to worldwide markets. By
forcing the FAA to look at specific areas, it was able to
review definitive certification processes. As a result, it

helped to reduce the cost and documentation of certifying
composite materials. The Advisory Circulars that have
come out of AGATE illuslmte its real world success. These
were concrete independent markers that signify the success
of some of the AGATE partnerships.
The technologicaladvances generated by AGATE
were signilicant in consideringthe program a success. The
improvements in crashworthiness illustrated notable safely
advancements as a result of testing collaboration.
Additionally, guidelines were established for bringing
advanced technology into the cockpit of small aircraft.This
changed the way airplanes are flown. According to the
participants, a low cost and high value technology with a
profit potential was the recipe for a healthy industry.
AGATE showed-that small aircraft represented real
proving ground for technology. Excitingnew advancements
were made with small aimaft at much less expense than
associated with larger aircraft. More importantly, a
tremendous synergy developed between the companiesthat
worked together. According to the participants, they were
able to involve more people such as students and bring the
changing technology into the classroom for added
understanding. Additionally AGATE allowed smaller
companies to work with the larger more established
companies. In the end, the smaller compauies were able to
deliver on many levels. This provided a simple
demonstrationthat the government's cost-sharing and risksharing accelerated product development. This developing
merev is consistent with the sociotechnicalsystemstheory
associated with team evolution when allowed to occur
within an open organizational system.
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a program such as SATS. There were several areas that
appeared relevant to this discussion, most notably in the
areasof goal definition,federalmanagementand leadership
(Figure 4).

Which of these successful trends may contribute
to other research alliances, such as SATS?
The trends that emerged in this area were more
diverse. Participants recognized that the way the groups
have opemted within AGATE might not be appropriate for

1
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AGATE Problems
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Federal Leadership

Federal Management
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Figure 4. AGATE Problems Expressed by Tree Nodes
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Overall, the participants agreed AGATE achieved a great
deal, but it did not fulfill its original goal-a fully
automated aircraft. To some of the participants, AGATE
was a fantastic program, but in the end, eight participants
found it to be inacient and unsatisfying. This was due in
part to a lack of project direction according to six
participants. AGATE needed set clear and specific goals
throughout the program even though that might have
undermined some research. The goals they had were
ambitious, but not enough attention was paid to integration
of results. In fairness, many participants said it was
conceivable that the drive was supposed to come from the
industry side. In the end, fivd participants said NASA
should have realized that ifa goal was not reachable in life
of a project, it should not set that goal. While most
participants expressed concern for the program, 32 would
gladly join AGATE again.
In terms of management and leadership, the
participants varied considerably, but there was an overall
division that revealed some basic trends (Table 2). Many
noted a tendency by NASA not to manage program in real

time, as there was a tremendous need to declare success. In
some cases, there was a failure to corral some of the
companies, especially those that appeared to be more
interested in the money than in the cooperation. Overall,
NASA remained professional and held to its standards
when people tried to bend the rules. Participants
acknowledgedthat every organization has its inefficiency.
In this case,engineerswere very focusedon technology, not
on explainingto public why they were spendingthe money.
In general, it improved four members' opinion of the
federal government. It was mentioned that there were many
innovative and dedicated people to work with in the FAA
and NASA.
Original analysis of the area focused on the
overwhelming positive response rate for the leadership.
However, while 14 participants were quick to point out the
visionary nature of the leadership, it was sometimeslacking
in the day-to-day operations of AGATE. By offering too
broad of goals and no support of management, the
management's effectiveness decreased and as a result
hampered the overall success of the program.

Table 2. Participant Perception to Federal Leadership a@ Management of AGATE
Negative
Positive
12
21
Leadership
8
14
Management
N = 33
Note: Participants' responses were permitted more than one response.

The majority of the participantswere impressedby
NASA's leadership at the top as exhibited by NASA
Administrator Bruce Holmes. Many participants said some
work packages changed leadership too often. This limited
their progress and influenced their perception. A key
problem was the government perspective that the
companies would be happy to work together. They did not
realize that the partners still had to make money. In order
to get companies to contribute money, NASA gave up some
of its leadenhip role. The regulations were relaxed so that
the companies in the consortium could share their
technology, but retain ownership. Even groups that had

Neutral
11
11

other programs like SATS.
Are there any common trends that Uudrate &ere
dissension may have hindered AGATE'S success?
Throughout the analysis of the interviews, the
researcher discovered several trends that illustrated where
dissension, open or concealed, may have limited AGATE'S
success. These same trends may appear in futurealliances
of this type. It was difficult to discern if these trends were
the cause or merely the result of some underlying problem.
The analysis highlighted threekey areas: program and goal
structureformation,communication division between large
and small industry members, and lack of federal
c ~ r p p n r tT h - m

~ ~ ( T I I w~tpPCf\PPi~llpprmr~~l~nt
PC

l d r c b i p did net nlwayc hm.0 tho ~OPOUICOE to &. T h o c o

rnrmmmont

individual factors affected the e o n of leadershipand
management overall and may continue to be an issue for

during the section of the tmnscripts where the mcipants
were asked if they had any advice to give future
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partnerships of a similar nature, such as in the SATS
program. The recommendations coded from this section
were closely tied to trends that revealed concerns and
problems with the AGATE program (Figure 5).

I

-

Program
Structure

Goal
Structure

Communication

Concerns

Open

Large
Com~anies
Commies

I

Com~anies

Figure 5. Advice for Future Partnerships Tree Node

According to 11 part~cipants, there was
considerable apprehension over which companies were
going to be part of AGATE as the program structure was
established. This often caused a battle between the larger
and smallercompanies. Someof the smaller companieshad
di£ticulty gaining acceptance. Once the groups were
established, the problems did not stop. The division
between large and small companies had a greater impact
than the battle between competing interests. Eleven of the
part~cipantssaw an even bigger problem in learning how to
work together. The in-fighting was mainly the result of a
protectionist desire for control, combined with a lack of
knowledge. In many groups there was a tendency not to
want to give up ownership of technology. Everyone fought
for the right to maintain intellectual ownership as
associated with company identity. This made the demand
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for integrated systems M c u l t to satisfy. The problem was
especially true when new companiesjoined the project. The
older partnefs wanted to be able to protect the work they
had already done. A lot of fighting involved figuring out
how to include new companies and protect the old ones.
Even though new partners were often brought on board
when earlier ones failed or quit the program, leaving their
projects unfinished; they were still viewed with distrust.
This muddled the process and made working together
difficult.
The clash between open and closed organizational
systems was strongestwithin this area. This illustrated also
the inconsistency between individual organizational goals
and those of AtiKL'E. 'I'he lack or a aehmnve program
structure that could adapt to the changing needs and
parameters of the program emerged as a significant trend
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that may affect future partnerships. When combined with
goal structural issues, the two were capable of having a
debilitating effect on AGATE and any future partnerships.
The lack of structure had several results. A
principal limitation was its restriction on information
sharing. According to seven participants, this unstable
structural nature fwlher contri%uted to security
consciousnessthat restricted collaboration. While AGATE
enabled companies to work toward common goals, it took
three years before the sharing really started in some of the
work packages. By then, most of them realized they could
work together and survive and y e n thrive. The ones who
did not reach this realization usually quit. Six participants
also notedplanning failures and project delays as irnpxbng
AGATE'S success. Plenty of mistakes were ma& along the
way, but members came to appreciate that these lessons
would have had to be learned at some time-either in
AGATE or on their own.
Communication was another key area that will be
a factor in future programs. Open communication, though
much desired, was seldom realized throughout the life of
the AGATE program. While this initially seemed to be one
of the larger problems, the division between the large and
small companies and problems with the goal structure
eclipsed it in the data analysis. Eleven participants
expressed frustration with the loose arrangement between
the participants who allowed the poor communication to
continue without repercussion. Some of the communication
issues were caused by the top down when reports and
requests for updates were not responded to in a timely
fashion. Many under-the-table negotiations occurred.Some
companies quit without any notice. Without compulsory
and unified report standards, some of the information was
lost to other companies. Participantssaid that there should
be careful and prompt communication between work
package leadersand parhcipants.Establishing a trust factor
and relationship building uphnt, will set the tone for
future collaboration and sharing that has to happen.Much
of the communication failure was attributed to
shortcomings in the federal support as indicated by its
leadership and management. These areas are examined
more closely within the confines of the Concerns node.
The p r i m concern, outside of communication
and structuralissues, focused primarily on thequestionable
support of the federal government. Lesser concerns
included missed marketing efforts and the limitations
associated with the protectionist mindset of many of the
participants. While this mindset did ease throughout the
course of the program, the inconsistent support from the
government continued to plague the program and goal
structures. Leadership and management were not able to
maintain positive control of the program due to a variety of

SA TS

events often beyond the control of the individual
representative. Budget cuts and personnel changes were
symptoms of the problem. Also of concern, marketing was
viewed as a missed opportunity.Many w c i p a n t s said this
would bave been an ideal time to begin gaining support not
but also in
only from other professional in related ind-,
beginning to educate and ease the general public into an
appreciationfor general aviation. By not taking on the role
of a marketer, AGATE failed to address an audience that
would continue to be more pmaient with follav-on
programs like SATS. These concerns weighed heavily in
the participants' recommendations and advice for future
partnerships. They suggested by recognizing and
addressing these concerns, future programs would be able
to gain more solid ground in achieving their goals.

CONCLUSION
The findingsrevealed a shared sense of discovery.
As the coding emerged, the results were evaluated within
the context of the policy research construct to help
determine applicable patterns and behavioral trends. This
additional review enabledthe researcher to better definethe
patterns and trends in terms of specific actions and possible
future application. Both NVivo and the policy research
construct allow for continued evaluation and feedback as
the nuances of the data are explored.
Most participants were satisfied with their
involvement, but some believed the government
bureaucracy limited their effectiveness and drove good
partners away. The forming of relationships was a lengthy
process, usually taking about two years, before the
participants were able to trust each other. This &lay
reduced the power of AGATE. By the time the
relationships were formed, the program was one-third
complete. With only one exception, the participants would
gladly join AGATE again. Granted, the majority would
apply the lessons learned wer the last seven years to avoid
some of the pitfalls and stalemates that divided the various
work packages at different stages. The struggle wer
proprietary information hampered and slowed the
development of new technologies and the ability to achieve
all of the program goals. By establishingthese terms earlier
in the process, considerable time and money would have
been saved. Strengthening the underlying social and
technical elements of each work package would have
helped to alleviate some of the initial tensions and
increased the resulting performance results.
This study showed the co~ectionamong the
diverse perceptions expressed during the i n t e ~ e w
portion
of the data collection. The identification of policy issues
and the subsequent acqwslbon of data tamtam me
~.Byprod~analyticfin~,the~herwas
able to contribute possible policy change results and
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recommendations. Further analysis of the similar and
dissimilar reaction in termsof the policy research construct,
showed how the connection of participant observations
rendered various valuable trends of this pamership
alliance. These trends may be applied to other progmm
with similar partnership orientations that may be a
consequence of this foundational group as well as for
partnerships not yet considered. This use of instrumental
reasoning allowed the researcher to better discern the
significant trends that offered context to future programs.
Even as AGATE was declared a success by its
program litmture and ?umerous parhcipants, the majority
of participants acknowledged that the program's promise
failed to be fully realized. To ensurethe successof program
of this nature, the appropriatestructure must be established
prior to it commencing. Likewise, the federal government
and each partxipant, regardless of affiliation, must be

I

I

completely and explicitly dedicated to the program goals.
According to the study's findings, for SATS to flourish, it
should employ AGATE'Shard-learned lessonsand not seek
to recreate a new course of action.
A strongerempbasis on the elements addressed by
the sociotechnical systems theory during the program
development would have helped to eliminate many of the
obstacles the participants encountered at the onset of the
program. By addressing at the onset the barriers associated
with competitors collaborating, as well as the formation of
groups to include such diverse part~cipants,the AGATE
program may have been more effective in achieving its
performance goals. Greater attention to the sociotechnical
elements influencing its operation would likely have
alleviated some of the earlier tensions, increased
communication, and bridged the way for more rapidly
achieving its goals.

+
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